

### **Kubota placed on line open to traffic**

**Issued to:** All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and RISQS registered contractors

**Ref:** NRL 17/04

**Date of issue:** 03/11/2017

**Location:** Rookery Bridge, Crewe

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### **Overview**

At 00:02 on 3 January 2017 a Kubota road rail vehicle was placed on an open goods line during a T3 possession of the adjacent main lines at Rookery Bridge between Crewe and Sandbach.

In the Sectional Appendix the main lines are called the "Wilmslows" and the goods lines are the "Manchester Independents", while nearer to Crewe the main lines are called the "Manchesters".

The T3 possession is cyclical and usually includes both the main lines and the goods lines, however on this occasion only the main lines were blocked.

### **Underlying causes**

The ES was not familiar with the location and had not attended a site visit or the planning meetings.

The ES was sourced from a contingent labour provider and the team dynamics of them managing local in-house teams had not been recognised.

The Engineering Supervisor (ES) was unfamiliar with the location and referred to the main lines at this location as both the "Manchesters" and "main lines". The Controller of Site Safety (COSS) took this to mean the Manchester Independent goods lines.

The access point cited in the Safe System of Work Pack (SSOWP) was Rookery Bridge, however this is located on the goods lines side of the railway and therefore is not viable when the goods lines are not included in the possession.

The ES conducted their briefing with one of the working parties over the telephone compromising clarity and restricting the chance to check understanding, including signed acceptance of the worksite details.

The SSOWP takes access point data from the National Hazard Directory (NHD) which allowed Rookery Bridge to be selected despite the goods lines not being included in the possession.

### **Key message**

The Person in Charge should be involved in the planning – a key factor is to make sure staff such as the ES, the PIC (and if different the COSS) have local knowledge.

Use location names as they are stated in the Sectional Appendix to avoid confusion.

Worksite briefings should be face-to-face to enable staff to sign their acceptance of the worksite details.

Attending site visits and planning meetings is of vital importance for safety critical staff.

The NHD is not 100% accurate and any discrepancy should be raised with the local Systems Support Manager.

Copies of Shared Learning documents are available on [Safety Central](#)