Incident Date / Time: 7th May 2013 / 1412hrs
Location: Inverhaggernie, Scotland.
Works Taking Place / Incident Type: Ballast work/ Operational Close Call
Issued By: Donald Stevenson, Senior Programme Manager
Project Name / Number: Scotland Programme: package 113 BCN-S/113
For the attention of: All Scotland and North East

Description of incident

During planned works, a Protection Controller (PC) took a Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) line blockage on the West Highland Line and gave the COSS permission to start work. Operatives were working on the track for approximately 30mins when they observed a train on the line they were working on. The workgroup had time to move off track via the authorised access egress point before the train passed.

CAUSES

The works were being carried out adjacent to Inverhaggernie UWC No. 1 on OBN2; blocking points Crainlarich Junction to Tyndrum Lower OBN2, however, the Protection Controller blocked Crainlarich Junction to Upper Tyndrum WHL protecting Inverhaggernie UWC No. 2 on WHL.

There was conflicting information between the COSS’ Safe System of Work (SSOW) Pack form RT9909 and the RT3181 required for a line blockage. Although the details within the RT9909 form were correct for the location of work, the COSS did not verify the arrangements a shift in advance as is required by NR/L2/OHS/019 Safety of people working on or near the line.

The PC did not have a copy of the SSOW and blocked the wrong line.

The reader is required to take action where appropriate to implement the following;

1. COSS’ must verify their SSOW pack at least one shift in advance or seek authorisation from the Responsible Manager. Review the Principal Contractors’ arrangements for planning and implementing Safe Systems of Work in accordance with NR/L2/OHS/019.

Always have a valid safe system of work in place before going on or near the line.