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Issued By: Thameslink Programme, HSEA Team, James Forbes House, 27 Great Suffolk Street, London SE1 0NS

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
Title: Three Bridges, Tamper instructed to cross T1742 points onto open road, 2nd Mar 2014

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Overview of Event:

During a Possession at Three Bridges, a Points Operator was given instruction by the Engineering Supervisor (ES) to move two sets of points to allow a tamper to move onto the slow lines, to travel to the work site. As the Points Operator prepared to set the route for the tamper, he noticed that the adjacent line was open. Should the Points Operator have reversed the points, the tamper would have moved out of the possession and onto an open line.

Diagram of event: Track layout including position of tamper / points




Note:


The above sketch is only to be viewed and used as a visual aid. The lay out does not aim to replicate the true geographical layout at Three Bridges and the surrounding area

Colour of area in possession & the worksite extended south of Three Bridges Station –

Colour of area open to traffic –

Tamper – 

Direction of Travel – 

Location of "Event" – 

Underlying Causes:

The investigation has concluded that the immediate cause was the **lack of clarity surrounding the precise limits of the possession**. Underlying causes include:

- **Management of train movements within the possession** – The Engineering Supervisor (ES) permitted the movement of the Tamper, without clearly understanding the parameters of the possession. The potential move, which was agreed within the ES's briefing, would have resulted in the tamper crossing a set of points and onto a road that was open to traffic.
- **Adequacy of briefing** – The briefing from the ES to the Points Operator (who was also acting as COSS), was not sufficient. In addition to this, the Points Operator did not seek clarity prior to commencing his duties.
- **Lack of site familiarity** – The ES did not undertake a site familiarisation prior to commencing the shift and was not familiar with the site.
- **Working Hours** – The ES exceeded his permissible working hours on the shift before the significant event occurred.

Key Messages:

- **Communication:** Make sure that the coordination arrangements are communicated, clear and understood at both the planning stage and prior to the commencement of each shift.

Briefing Arrangements: It is imperative that workers who receive a brief from an ES (or any other safety critical staff), fully understand the contents of the brief and have an acceptable level of site familiarisation.

- **Management of Working Time:** Working time should be strictly monitored to avoid any work exceedances which could cause fatigue.