

Shared Learning

The Thameslink Programme

Issue Date: 12 Apr 2018 - For further info contact sharon.fink@networkrail.co.uk

Issue Number: TLP087

Title: Staff cross open line

Overview of Event: As part of the extensive London Bridge Redevelopment, the thoroughfare platforms which serve the Canon Street Line Up Bi Directional (platform 3) & Snowhill Line Down Bi Directional (platform 4) are in the process of ongoing significant upgrade works. In the delivery of these works there is a requirement of weekly surveying of the installed tactile levels, this task is completed with a minimum of 2 surveyors and a Costain specified role called a Platform Supervisor.

The Platform Supervisor has the duty of keeping non-PTS staff 1.25m from the platform edge. However, on the night shift of 13th February, a Platform Supervisor, in an effort to change platform as part of the continuation of the survey - allowed not only themselves but also a non PTS surveyor to use an access ramp to then cross tracks of which the Platform Supervisor had no formal procedural knowledge of which lines were live or not as they were not in possession of a SSoW pack.

General Key Messages:

- Work planners must consider where short cuts on site could tempt staff to not follow rules and cover this in any documentation.
- Supervisors responsible for works must make sure that in areas of high risk they emphasise specific rules.
- Teams undertaking compliance checks must carry these out by engaging with teams to understand if plans are being followed or if local deviations are occurring .


Causes:

Immediate - Crossing of a Live railway by a non-PTS member of staff.

Root and Underlying Causes

- Training, Knowledge and Experience - Platform Supervisor is a qualified CoSS yet went against training and knowledge by allowing the crossing of non-PTS qualified staff over live rails. They have admitted negligence.
- Training, Knowledge and Experience - Surveyor, whilst having some previous rail knowledge, is not and has never held PTS qualification; therefore, whilst having been briefed prior about working limits, has conceded and been influenced by an experienced CoSS and concedes to his greater qualified knowledge in being allowed to cross tracks.
- Procedure - The Platform Supervisor was in disregard of his project specific platform briefing , he had task of keeping non-PTS members of his workgroup 1.25m from the platform edge. They have admitted negligence.
- Procedure - Platform Supervisor was not in possession of a SSoW pack as they weren't a CoSS for this shift and therefore procedurally unaware of which lines were blocked, under possession of timings of current rail being turned off/on.
- Communication - Despite noted regular briefings & toolbox talks as stated in the witness statement, that is the TBS & WPP about non-PTS staff not encroaching 1.25m of the platform edge – this had been ignored and/or influenced by the experienced CoSS qualified Platform Supervisor. The Platform Supervisor admitted lapse in memory of his role.

Photo of Event :



Stock view of platforms 2 and 3 looking towards the country end. Platform 4 is to the right of the picture

Actions Taken As a Result of the Investigations:

- The Platform Supervisor and Surveyor to go through Costain's Just & Fair Culture process to access accountability with regards to the incident.
- Learning from the event to be shared throughout Costain via Safety Lessons Learnt distribution.
- Revised TBS titled *Setting Out and Surveying on Station Property* to include highlighted box strenuously stating that this TBS covers persons to be up to 1.25m within platform edge.
- Additionally, reference the other TBS called *Setting out and Surveying 'On or Near the Line'* - again strenuously stating that this TBS can be briefed to those encroaching platform edge/track and are suitable covered by being PTS qualified or cover by TVP