# Shared Learning

Key learning following a serious incident



## IP Signalling

Issue Date: 15/05/2019 - For further info contact graham.mills2@networkrail.co.uk

Issue Number: IPSIG-SL008 Title: Euston Enabling Works Irregualar Signal Sequence

#### **Overview of Event:**

At 10.30 on the 10th January 2019, the driver of the 10.23 Virgin Trains, London Euston to Shrewsbury Service 9J14, reported an irregular signal sequence on the Down fast. Signal WM117 displayed a green aspect, this was followed by WM119 signal displaying a red aspect. This caused 9J14 to pass WM119 signal at danger. This irregular sequence was caused by a power outage in the supply system due to the unauthorised opening of a switch within Kilburn SSP. At 10.42, the sequence was then tested by train service 1S52 and the sequence was reported to be back to normal. Although this unauthorised isolation only lasted several seconds, it resulted in 22 minutes delay.

This Fused Switch had been isolated during what was meant to be a non-intrusive survey of location case 3/74A and Kilburn SSP by the Siemens E&P Construction Manager and the Maintainers E&P Engineer. Historically the switch that was isolated inside the Kilburn SSP had not been in use, but due to a recent non project related cable strike the circuits had to be reconfigured resulting in this switch now being utilised.

The Siemens Construction Manager was showing the NR E&P Engineer project work which had taken place within the location, believing he was assisting the Engineer, he isolated the switch to allow them to look inside. This unfortunately isolated an operation signal supply, which resulted in the irregular signal sequence.

Both men where unaware at the time of the consequences of this isolation.

#### **Discussion Points:**

Out of the Siemens 4 steps, 3 were not followed.

#### Always be fit for work - YES

Always receive a briefing before starting work – NO. There was a briefing for the original planned site visit (The works that Siemens were going to carry out at Canterbury Terrace), however there was no documented briefing or verbal briefing for the unplanned additional works requested by the Network Rail E&P engineer. (Intrusive Survey of the inside of location case 3/74A or the opening of the panel inside the Kilburn SSP)

**Report unsafe events and conditions – NO.** There were several opportunities to raise close calls where the existing infrastructure was below the standards. (no padlocks on switches/ no plans etc.)

**Stop work if anything changes – NO.** The Siemens and Network Rail Engineer did not stop due to the changes identified with their works. (From Non-Intrusive to Intrusive Survey).

### **Lesson Learnt – Action to the rest of Business:**

Operational equipment <u>must not</u> be switched **'OFF'** or **'ON'** during operational hours! The only time, operational equipment can be switched **'OFF'** or **'ON'** is during planned works or during a 'Planned Possession'.

Additional or unplanned works that have not been documented within the task briefing sheet must not take place.

Understand the limits of your responsibility, and your role, level of competency. Never undertake any job unless you have been trained and assessed as competent. (Life Saving Rule)

Photo of Switch:



Location:



